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Plausibility of the Intuitive Criterion of 
Cho and Kreps*
Cheol Park**
This paper points out a problem associated with the popular intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). 
We use the Spence job market signaling model to illustrate a rather counter-intuitive prediction of the 
intuitive criterion and show that the criterion is based on the assumption that low type workers either do not 
realize possible deviation by high type workers, or do not respond to such deviations. 
I. Introduction
Signaling games typically have many Nash equilibria, and some equilibria are unreasonable in 
the sense that players in those equilibria are to entertain unwarranted belief off the equilibrium 
path. To rule out these unreasonable equilibria, we usually resort to various types of refinements 
of the Nash equilibrium. Among these refinements, the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps 
seems to be the most powerful and is the most widely used. In this short paper, we plan to 
point out inherent assumptions behind the intuitive criterion and present another analysis to 
illustrate the problem that could arise as a result. 
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II. The Spence Job Market Signaling Model
We first specify the model and show the usual Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model. 
There is nothing new in this part of the paper. We simply summarize textbook discussions. 
One can find similar exposition in any advanced textbook on microeconomics.
We consider a simplified job market signaling model of Spence (1973) with a single firm 
hiring workers and a single worker looking for a job. Workers are willing to work for any 
positive wage  , and firms are willing to hire them as long as they pay less than workers’ 
productivity. A worker’s productivity, denoted by t, can be either high(t=tH) or low(t=tL) with 
tH › tL › 0. A worker of type t is worth $t to the firm. Productivity is the worker’s private 
information. The firm’s prior belief is given by μ = Pr(t=tH) with 0 ‹ μ ‹ 1.
Before entering the job market, a worker of type i=H ,L can acquire education e≥0 at a cost 
of c(e)=ϑie. It is assumed that education does not affect productivity; productivity is completely 
determined by the type of the worker alone. The key assumption is that it costs more for a low 
type worker to acquire education: ϑH ‹ ϑL. This is the famous single crossing condition. 
For simplicity, we assume workers’ preferences are represented by a linear function in (w.ϑ): 
ui(w, e) = w-ϑie. This makes things easier to analyze because indifference curves are straight 
lines with slopes ϑi: dw/de|u⁻=ϑi. The following Figure 1 shows indifference curves of the 
workers. 
Let pi(e) be the probability that a worker of type i=H, L chooses an education level e, and let 
μ(i|e) denote the probability that the worker is type i(i=H, L) conditional on the observation 
of acquired education e. We will assume that the worker has all the bargaining power so that 
they get paid:
w(e)=μ(H|e)tH+[1-μ(H|e)]tL
Each worker will choose such e that maximizes w(e)-ϑie. We will use the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (PBE) as our equilibrium concept. The following gives us the exact definition of 
PBE for our game.
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Definition: A PBE is a strategy pi(e) and conditional beliefs μ(i|e) such that
1. If pi(e*)›0, then 
2.   whenever  for at least one type
3. If , there is no restriction on  
4. Workers are paid 
Since education does not affect productivity, the full information equilibrium is  
and  . However, this is not incentive compatible because the low type wants to 
get paid the high type’s wage.
III. Separating Equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium, the type of each worker will be known. Thus a low type worker 
will obtain no education, so  whereas a high type obtains some education: . For the 
low type to choose  and to be paid tL, we should have . Thus, we get:
Figure 1. Indifference Curves in (e, u) Space
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For the high type, we should have  , Thus, we should have:
The two critical values  and  are depicted in the following Figure 2.
The belief supporting this as an equilibrium is
The least costly separating equilibrium is such that the high type worker chooses  . While 
the requirements for the PBE do not rule out other equilibria with  , we can eliminate 
these equilibria using an argument of dominance. 
 
Figure 2. Separating Equilibria
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VI. Elimination of All but One Separating Equilibria Using Dominance
Consider a separating equilibrium eH where  . The belief supporting this as an 
equilibrium satisfies . 
A low type worker has no incentive to choose  because even if the firm believes  
indicates a high type and pays tH, a low type worker’s expected payoff cannot be higher than tL (see 
the Figure 2). In other words,  is a dominated strategy for a low type worker. Thus the 
correct belief after observing  must be   . If that is the case, a high type 
worker choosing  is NOT optimal because  is better. This argument of dominance 
eliminates all the separating equilibria except for the least-cost equilibrium  .
1. Pooling Equilibrium
We can now describe the pooling equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium, all workers acquire 
the same level of education: . Since the level of education does not provide any 
new information, (a) the posterior will be the same as the prior as long as education at the 
level of ep is acquired: , and (b) at ep, both types will be paid the same wage: 
. 
Now, the question is, what will happen if  is observed. This is the question of the off-
the-equilibrium path belief. Suppose that when faced with  , the firm believes that the 
worker is high type with probability μ´. Then, the low type will choose ep if
If  , it is required  . If ,  could be higher than  .  
Suppose the belief is such that
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Since education does not lead to a higher wage, why would anyone pay for it? In other 
words,  seems to be the only reasonable pooling equilibrium. But, the PBE requirements 
do not rule out equilibria with  . Thus there is a continuum of pooling equilibria.
2. Elimination of All Pooling Equilibria Using the Intuitive Criterion
Consider a deviation . This deviation cannot be ruled out by the dominance con-
sideration alone because a low type worker can get more than his equilibrium payoff if the firm 
somehow believes that the deviation has come from the high type.
Now, consider a deviation e˝. A low type worker has no incentive to choose this deviation, 
because he cannot get more than his equilibrium payoff    . Therefore, the intuitive 
criterion requires the firm should believe that the deviation e˝ comes from a high type worker. 
Then, as the Figure 4 shows, the high type worker had better choose e˝ than ep  . This breaks all 
 
Figure 3. Pooling Equilibria
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the pooling equilibria.
Since the deviation must come from the high type worker  must hold. Since the 
pooling equilibrium is supported by belief , this will break all the pooling equilibria.
Cho-Kreps’ intuitive criterion may give you unreasonable outcome. Consider the case 
where  so that there are very few low type workers. The allocation from the separating 
equilibrium 
  
is Pareto inferior to that from the pooling equilibrium  . This can be easily seen from the 
fact that as   , we have . Yet, this is the prediction of Cho-Kreps. 
3. Plausibility of the Intuitive Criterion
Let’s start with the most efficient allocation  where no worker acquires education and 
ask whether this is stable in some sense. The high type worker will try to distinguish himself by 
acquiring some education. At first he may think that by acquiring education between e* and ê, 
he will be able to persuade the firm that he is in fact a high type and receive a high wage tH. 
Figure 4. Intuitive Criterion and Pooling Equilibria
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By choosing education between and e* and ê, the high type worker is telling the firm the 
following. 
“No low type worker will choose this level of education because it will give him a payoff 
less than his equilibrium payoff  . Since only a high type worker can afford to acquire 
this much education, you must think that I am a high type.” 
To this, the firm may reply: 
“Your argument is correct only if low type workers do not know what you are doing 
and keep believing that they will get the equilibrium payoff of  . If they know what you 
are trying to do, they will not believe that they will get the payoff of  . If I take your 
argument and believe that you are a high type worker, then these low type workers who do 
not deviate will get tL, not . Therefore, low type workers now have incentives to deviate. 
Yet they will never choose an education level more than e .̋ Hence, if you want to persuade 
me that you are a high type worker, you had better choose education level between  and ê.”
In other words, the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps implicitly assumes that the low 
 
Figure 5. Deviation by High Type Workers
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type workers will not realize the possibility of deviation by high type workers. If low type 
workers anticipate such deviation, they will not compare the payoff from deviation with their 
equilibrium payoff; they will compare it with their payoff when the deviation by the high type 
worker is successful. 
If we accept the argument above, a high type worker can successfully deviate only when 
 . This is equivalent to:
Thus, if this inequality holds, the high type worker can successfully persuade the firm by 
deviating and no pooling equilibrium will survive. On the other hand, if the inequality does 
not hold, or if there are a lot more high type workers, then pooling equilibrium will survive. 
The following figure shows the case with  . In this case, there is no level of 
education a high type worker can choose that will successfully persuade the firm that he is 
indeed a high type worker. 
 
Figure 6. When No Successful Deviation is Possible
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V. Conclusion
We illustrate a problem that can arise when we apply the popular intuitive criterion of Cho 
and Kreps. We believe that a more clear picture will emerge if we model the job market signal-
ing process more properly. For example, in the usual model of job market signaling, the time it 
takes to get education is not explicitly modeled. If we use some model akin to the overlapping 
generation model where workers of different generations observe past contract offered for a giv-
en level of education, then we may be able to sort out unreasonable equilibria more easily and 
without a lot of ad-hoc assumptions. But, this work needs time to complete as well.
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